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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS
Blind Spots of Neural Sequence Models
by
Paarth Neekhara
Master of Science in Computer Science
University of California San Diego, 2019
Professor Shlomo Dubnov, Chair
Deep neural networks (DNNs) serve as a backbone of many image, language and speech
processing systems. Such models are being deployed extensively in personal devices, cloud based
applications and automated security services like face recognition, speaker identification etc.
While DNNs have shown to achieve state of the art results in their respective domains, recent
studies have exposed the vulnerabilities of these models to adversarial attacks. The work on
adversarial examples has primarily focused on the domain of images.
In this work, we explore the vulnerabilities of neural networks working on sequential
data like text and audio. We propose a novel method to repurpose text classification networks
for alternate tasks. This gives incentive to adversaries to steal computational resources from a
viii
system provider. An adversary in such an attack scenario can potentially train a simple input
transformation for discrete sequences for repurposing the victim model for a new classification
task.
We also study the existence of universal adversarial perturbations for Automatic Speech
Recognition (ASR) Systems. We propose an algorithm to find a single quasi-imperceptible
perturbation, which when added to any arbitrary speech signal, will most likely fool the victim
speech recognition model. Our experiments demonstrate the application of our proposed technique
by crafting audio-agnostic universal perturbations for the state-of-the-art ASR system – Mozilla
DeepSpeech. Additionally, we show that such perturbations generalize to a significant extent
across models that are not available during training, by performing a transferability test on a
WaveNet based ASR system.
For example, a carefully designed imperceptible perturbation in an image can cause a
victim image classification model to mis-classify the image. Such attacks target the ”blind spots”
of neural networks input domain. In this work, we focus on exposing such blind spots in neural
sequence models for language and speech.
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Chapter 1
Introduction: Adversarial Examples
Deep neural networks (DNN) are being extensively deployed as image, language and
speech processing systems in personal devices, cloud based applications and automated security
services. While DNNs have shown to achieve state of the art results in their respective domains,
recent studies have exposed the vulnerabilities of these models to adversarial attacks. For example,
a carefully designed imperceptible perturbation in an image can cause a victim image classification
model to mis-classify the image. Such attacks target the “blind spots” of neural networks input
domain. In this work, we focus on exposing such blind spots in neural sequence models for
language and speech.
In this chapter, we introduce adversarial examples and vulneribilities of neural networks.
We go over some of the prior work in the domain of adversarial attacks and adversarial repro-
gramming. Section 1.6 covers existing work in the domain of adversarial attacks on Speech
Reocgnition System. This chapter lays the necessary background for our proposed adversarial
attacks in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.
1
1.1 Adversarial Examples
Adversarial examples are intentionally designed inputs to a machine learning model that
cause the model to make a mistake [23]. These attacks can be broadly classified into untargeted
and targeted attacks. In the untargeted attack scenario, the adversary succeeds as long as the
victim model classifies the adversarial input into any class other than the correct class, while in
the targeted attack scenario, the adversary succeeds only if the model classifies the adversarial
input into a specific incorrect class. In both these scenarios, the intent of the adversary is usually
malicious and the outcome of the victim model is still limited to the original task being performed
by the model.
Adversarial attacks of image-classification models often use gradient descent on an image
to create a small perturbation that causes the machine learning model to mis-classify it [58, 16].
There has been a similar line of adversarial attacks on neural networks with discrete input
domains [48, 65], where the adversary modifies a few tokens in the input sequence to cause
misclassification by a sequence model. In addition, efforts have been made in designing more
general adversarial attacks in which the same modification can be applied to many different
inputs to generate adversarial examples [17, 23, 42]. For example, authors [12] trained an
Adversarial Transformation Network that can be applied to all inputs to generate adversarial
examples targeting a victim model or a set of victim models. In this work, we aim to learn such
universal transformations of discrete sequences for a fundamentally different task: Adversarial
Reprogramming described below.
1.2 Untrageted vs Targeted Attacks
In untargeted attacks, the goal of the adversary is to cause mis-prediction by the victim
model. let l(x) denote the label produced by a victim model for an input x, the goal of the
adversary is to design an adversarial input x′ which is perceived as indistinguishable from the
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original input x but causes mis-classification i.e l(x) 6= l(x′). In targeted attacks, the goal of the
adversary is to design an adversarial input x′ which is perceived as indistinguishable from the
original input x, and maps to a target label t i.e l(x) = t.
1.3 Transferability of Adversarial Samples
Adversarial sample transferability is the property that adversarial samples produced by
training on a specific model can affect another model, even if they have different architectures.
Since in case of black-box attack, adversary does not have access to the target model F, an attacker
can train a substitute model F’ locally to generate adversarial example x+δ which then can be
transferred to the victim neural network. While there have been many studies conducted on the
transferability of adversarial examples in the image domain [55, 45, 13, 59, 39], but to the best of
our knowledge similar efforts have not been applied in the audio domain.
1.4 Adversarial Reprogramming
Adversarial Reprogramming [22] introduced a new class of adversarial attacks where
the adversary wishes to repurpose an existing neural network for a new task chosen by the
attacker, without the attacker needing to compute the specific desired output. The adversary
achieves this by first defining a hard-coded one-to-one label remapping function hg that maps
the output labels of the adversarial task to the label space of the classifier f ; and learning a
corresponding adversarial reprogramming function h f (.;θ) that transforms an input (X˜) 1 from
the input space of the new task to the input space of the classifier. The authors proposed an
adversarial reprogramming function h f (.;θ), for repurposing ImageNet models for adversarial
classification tasks. An adversarial example Xadv for an input image X˜ can be generated using the
1X˜ is an ImageNet size (n×n×3) padded input image
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following adversarial program: 2
Xadv = h f (X˜ ;θ) = X˜ + tanh(θ)
where θ ∈ Rn×n×3 is the learnable weight matrix of the adversarial program (where n is the
ImageNet image width). Let P(y|X) denote the probability of the victim model predicting label
y for an input X . The goal of the adversary is to maximize the probability P(hg(yadv)|Xadv)
where yadv is the label of the adversarial input Xadv. The following optimization problem that
maximizes the log-likelihood of predictions for the adversarial classification task, can be solved
using backpropagation to train the adversarial program parameterized by θ:
θˆ= argminθ
(− logP(hg(yadv)|Xadv)+λ||θ||22) (1.1)
where λ is the regularization hyperparameter. Since the adversarial program proposed is a
trainable additive contribution θ to the inputs, it’s application is limited to neural networks
with a continuous input space. Also, since the the above optimization problem is solved by
back-propagating through the victim network, it assumes a white-box attack scenario where the
adversary has gained access to the victim model’s parameters.
In our work, we will describe how we can learn a simple transformation in the discrete
space to extend the application of adversarial reprogramming on sequence classification problems.
We also propose a training algorithm in the black-box setting where the adversary may not have
access to the model parameters.
2Masking ignored because it is only a visualization convenience
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1.5 Universal Adversarial Perturbations
In [42], the authors try to find an universal perturbation vector which can fool the network
to predict a false classification output on most of the validation instances. Let kˆ(x) be the
classification output for an input x and let x be distributed according to µ then they propose that
we want to find a universal perturbation v such that:
kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x) for ”most” x ˜µ.
They solve this problem as an optimization problem with constraints which ensure that the
universal perturbation obtained has the smallest possible p-norm and will also be able to fool the
desired number of instances in the training set. The interesting thing about this paper is that they
show that only training their model over small number of instances (e.g. 500 examples) can fool
the networks on about 30% of the cases in the validation set. Also they show that the universal
perturbation produced using one network say VGG-16 can also be used to fool other network say
GoogLeNet showing that their method is doubly universal.
1.6 Adversarial Attacks on Speech Recognition Systems
In this section we discuss some prior work on adversarial attacks in the audio domain.
The goal of these works is to design an imperciptle audio perturbation which when added to an
audio signal causes mis-transcription or mis-classification by a neural speech reocgnition model.
1.6.1 Audio Adversarial Examples: Targeted Attacks on Speech-to-Text
In this paper [18], the authors generate targeted audio adversarial examples for automatic
speech recognition systems that are end-to-end. Their white-box iterative optimization-based
attack achieves 100 % success rate on Mozillas open source Speech-To-Text engine DeepSpeech
[29], which is a state-of-the-art speech-to-text transcription neural network. Given any natural
5
Figure 1.1: Targeted Adversarial attack on Speech Recognition System [18]
waveform x, they are able to construct a perturbation δ that is nearly inaudible, but so that x+δ is
recognized as any desired phrase by a victim neural network. The key differences between this
work and a prior work [20] by the same authors, is that in their prior efforts they only targeted
traditional systems such as HMMs and GMMs, using obfuscated examples and they do not
operate on end-to-end neural networks. Obfuscated examples means that the examples sound
like random noise rather than normal human perceptible speech, which makes attacks using
obfuscated examples easier.
1.6.2 Generating Adversarial Examples for Speech Recognition
The authors of [31] demonstrate successful attacks on neural ASR systems based on
WaveNet [61], using fast gradient sign method [23]. The authors note that ASRs rely on the Mel
Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) as features of the input audio data. In this attack, the
adversary designs perturbations on MFCC (mel spectogram) representation instead of the raw
audio waveforms as done in [18] and described in Section 1.6.1. The adversary then decodes raw
audio from the MFCC representation and generated adversarial examples for the victim model.
The auhtors demonstrated their attack on the WaveNet model for speech recognition.
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1.6.3 Did you hear that? Adversarial Examples Against Automatic Speech
Recognition
This paper [6] focuses on generating adversarial noise to perform targeted attacks on
Automatic Speech Recognition systems (ASRs) in a black-box setting where the attacker knows
nothing about the model architecture and parameter values, but is capable of querying the model
results. The authors argue that using backpropagation and other gradient based methods to
generate adversarial noise, are not easily applicable to speech recognition models.
As previously stated, ASRs rely on the Mel Frequency Cepstral Coefficients (MFCCs) as
features of the input audio data. To avoid differentiating through MFCC computations, the authors
propose a genetic algorithm which is a gradient-free optimization method. The genetic algorithm
based method does not require knowledge of the victim model architecture or parameters and
can therefore be utilized to perform black-box attacks where the attackers do not have access to
model parameters and architectures.
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Chapter 2
Adversarial Reprogramming of Text
Classification Neural Networks
2.1 Introduction
Adversarial Reprogramming [22] is a new class of adversarial attacks where a machine
learning algorithm is repurposed to perform a new task chosen by the attacker. The authors demon-
strated how an adversary may repurpose a pre-trained ImageNet [21] model for an adversarial
classification task like classification of MNIST digits or CIFAR-10 images without modifying the
network parameters. Since machine learning agents can be reprogrammed to perform unwanted
actions as desired by the adversary, such an attack can lead to theft of computational resources
such as cloud-hosted machine learning models. Besides theft of computational resources, the
adversary may perform a task that violates the code of ethics of the system provider.
The adversarial reprogramming approach proposed by [22] trains an additive contribution
θ to the inputs of the neural network to repurpose it for the desired alternate task. The adversary
defines a hard-coded mapping between the class labels of the original and adversarial task. The
adversarial program parameterized by θ is updated such that the classifier predicted label, when
8
mapped to the adversarial label space, correctly classifies an adversarial input. This approach
assumes a white-box attack scenario where the adversary has access to the network’s parameters.
Also, the adversarial program proposed in this work is only applicable to tasks where the input
space of the the original and adversarial task is continuous.
H e n r i q u e sAdversarial Task: Name Classification
Adversarial Reprogramming Function (fḎ)
Victim Model - Questions Classifier (C)
 other always live What Who does ind Who gold is off ...Original Task: Question Classification
Portuguese
Human
Label Remapping (fL)
Figure 2.1: Example of Adversarial Reprogramming for Sequence Classification. We aim to
design and train the adversarial reprogramming function fθ, such that it can be used to repurpose
a pretrained classifier C, for a desired adversarial task.
In this work, we propose a method to adversarially repurpose neural networks which
operate on sequences from a discrete input space. The task is to learn a simple transformation
(adversarial program) from the input space of the adversarial task to the input space of the
neural network such that the neural network can be repurposed for the adversarial task. We
propose a context-based vocabulary remapping function as an adversarial program for sequence
classification networks. We propose training procedures for this adversarial program in both
white-box and black-box scenarios. In the white-box attack scenario, where the adversary has
access to the classifier’s parameters, a Gumbel-Softmax trick [32] is used to train the adversarial
program. Assuming a black-box attack scenario, where the adversary may not have access to the
classifier’s parameters, we present a REINFORCE [63] based optimization algorithm to train the
adversarial program.
We apply our proposed methodology on various text classification models including
Recurrent Neural Networks such as LSTMs and bidirectional LSTMs, and Convolutional Neural
9
Networks (CNNs). We demonstrate experimentally, how these neural networks trained on a par-
ticular (original) text classification task can be repurposed for alternate (adversarial) classification
tasks. We experiment with different text classification datasets given in table 2.1 as candidate
original and adversarial tasks and adversarially reprogram the aforementioned text classification
models to study the robustness of the attack.
2.2 Methodology
2.2.1 Adversarial Reprogramming Problem Definition
Consider a sequence classifier C trained on the original task of mapping a sequence s ∈ S
to a class label lS ∈ LS i.e C : s 7→ lS. An adversary wishes to repurpose the original classifier C
for the adversarial task C′ of mapping a sequence t ∈ T to a class label lT ∈ LT i.e C′ : t 7→ lT .
The adversary can achieve this by hard-coding a one-to-one label remapping function:
fL : lS 7→ lT
that maps an original task label to the new task label and learning a corresponding adversarial
reprogramming function:
fθ : t 7→ s
that transforms an input from the input space of the adversarial task to the input space of the
original task. The adversary aims to update the parameters θ of the adversarial program fθ such
that the mapping fL(C( fθ(t))) can perform the adversarial classification task C′ : t 7→ lT .
10
2.2.2 Adversarial Reprogramming Function
The goal of the adversarial reprogramming function fθ : t 7→ s is to map a sequence t to s
such that it is labeled correctly by the classifier fL(C).
The tokens in the sequence s and t belong to some vocabulary lists VS and VT respectively.
We can represent the sequence s as s= s1,s2, ..,sN where si is the vocabulary index of the ith token
in sequence s in the vocabulary list VS. Similarly sequence t can be represented as t = t1, t2, .., tN
where ti is the vocabulary index of the ith token of sequence t in the vocabulary list VT .
In the simplest scenario, the adversary may try to learn a vocabulary mapping from VT
to VS using which each ti can be independently mapped to some si to generate the adversarial
sequence. Such an adversarial program has limited potential since the representational capacity
of such a reprogramming function is very limited. We experimentally support this hypothesis
by showing how such a transformation has limited potential for the purpose of adversarial
reprogramming.
A more sophisticated adversarial program can be a sequence to sequence machine transla-
tion model [57] that learns a translation t 7→ s for adversarial reprogramming. While theoretically
this is a good choice, it defeats the purpose of adversarial reprogramming. This is because the
computational complexity of training and using such a machine translation model would be
similar if not greater than that of a new sequence classifier for the adversarial task C′.
The adversarial reprogramming function should be computationally inexpensive but
powerful enough for adversarial repurposing. To this end, we propose a context-based vocabulary
remapping model that produces a distribution over the target vocabulary at each time-step based
on the surrounding input tokens. More specifically, we define our adversarial program as a
trainable 3-d matrix θk×|VT |×|VS| where k is the context size. Using this, we generate a probability
11
distribution pii over the vocabulary VS at each time-step i as follows:
hi =
k−1
∑
j=0
θ[ j, ti+bk/2c− j] (2.1)
pii = so f tmax(hi) (2.2)
Both hi and pii are vectors of length |VS|. To generate the adversarial sequence s we sample each
si independently from the distribution pii.
si ∼ pii
Given the max input length N accepted by the victim model, the input sequence t is padded
with bk/2c instances of a dummy token before the first token and N− length(t)+bk/2c instances
after the last token to generate an N length output s . For sequences with length(t)> N, we select
the first N tokens of t as input to the adversarial reprogramming function fθ. We demonstrate in
the Experiments section, that this approach works for different combinations of adversarial and
original tasks with different average sequence lengths.
In practice, we implement this adversarial program as a single layer of 1-d convolution
over the sequence of one-hot encoded vectors of adversarial tokens ti with |VT | input channels
and |VS| output channels with k-length kernels parameterized by θk×|VT |×|VS|. Note that the
time-complexity of using this adversarial reprogramming function (equations 2.1,2.2) is just
O(k×|VS|× length(t)) and it can be parallelized to improve further.
2.2.3 White-box Attack
In the white-box attack scenario, we assume that the adversary has gained access to the
victim network’s parameters and architecture. Let P(l|s) denote the probability of predicting label
12
Update θ
Update θ
ls
Label Remapping fL
lt
Reward
+1 : Correct Preditcion
-1 : Incorrect Prediction
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 tN
s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 sN
Adversarial Program - 
Policy Network
Action - Sample a token
REINFORCE
Pad Pad
Text Classifier C
target = fL-1( lt ) Cross Entropy Loss
t1 t2 t3 t4 t5 tN
g1 g2 g3 g4 g5 gN
Distributions over Vs (πi’s) Distributions over Vs (πi’s)
Adversarial Program - 
Policy Network
Generate Gumbel
Distribution Backpropatgation
Pad Pad
Text Classifier C
Figure 2.2: Adversarial Reprogramming Function and Training Procedures. Left: White-
box Adversarial Reprogramming. The adversary generates gumbel distributions gi at each time-
step which are passed as a soft version of one-hot vectors to the classifier C. The cross-entropy
loss between the predictions and the mapped class is backpropagated to train the adversarial
program θ. Right: Black-box Adversarial Reprogramming. The adversarial reprogramming
function is used as a policy network and the sampled action (sequence s) is passed to the classifier
C to get a reward based on prediction correctness. The adversarial program is then trained using
REINFORCE.
l for a sequence s by classifier C. We wish to maximize the probability P( f−1L (lt)| fθ(t)) which is
the probability of the output label of the classifier being mapped to the correct class lt for an input
t in the domain of the adversarial task. Therefore we need to solve the following log-likelihood
maximization problem:
θˆ= argminθ(−∑
t
log(P( f−1L (lt)| fθ(t)))) (2.3)
Note that that the output of the adversarial program s = fθ(t) is a sequence of discrete
tokens. This makes the above optimization problem non-differentiable. Prior works [37, 27, 65]
have demonstrated how we can smoothen such an optimization problem using the Gumbel-
Softmax [32] distribution.
In order to backpropagate the gradient information from the classifier to the adversarial
program, we smoothen the generated tokens si using Gumbel-Softmax trick as per the following:
For an input sequence t, we generate a sequence of Gumbel distributions g = g1,g2, ..,gN .
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The nth component of distribution gi is generated as follows:
gni =
exp((log(pini )+ rn)/temp)
∑ j exp((log(pi
j
i )+ r j)/temp)
where pii is the softmax distribution at the ith time-step obtained using equation 2.2, rn
is a random number sampled from the Gumbel distribution [28] and temp is the temperature of
Gumbel-Softmax.
Gumbel-Softmax approximates one-hot vectors of si’s with differentiable representations.
The temperature parameter controls the flatness of this distribution. As temp→ 0 the Gumbel
distribution becomes close to a one-hot vector and as temp→∞ the Gumbel distribution assumes
a uniform distribution over |VS| variables. The sequence then passed to the classifier C is the
sequence g which serves as a soft version of the one-hot encoded vectors of si’s. Since the model
is now differentiable, we can solve the following optimization problem using backpropagation:
θˆ= argminθ(−∑
t
log(P( f−1L (lt)|g))) (2.4)
During training the temperature parameter is annealed from some high value tmax to a very low
value tmin. The details of this annealing process for our experiments have been included in the
supplementary material.
2.2.4 Black-box Attack
In the black-box attack scenario, the adversary can only query the victim classifier C
for labels. Since the adversarial program needs to produce a discrete output to feed as input
to the classifier C, it is not possible to pass the gradient update from the classifier fL(C) to the
adversarial program θ using standard back-propagation. Also, in the black-box attack setting it is
not possible to back-propagate the cross entropy loss through the classifier C in the first place.
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We formulate the sequence generation problem as a Reinforcement Learning problem
[9, 10, 67] where the adversarial reprogramming function is the policy network. We define the
state, action, policy and reward for this problem as follows:
• State and Action Space: The state of the adversarial program is a sequence t ∈ T where T
is the input space of the adversarial task. An action of an RL agent is to produce a sequence
of tokens s ∈ S where S is the input space of the original task.
• Policy: The adversarial program parameterized by θ, models the stochastic policy piadv(s|t;θ)
such that a sequence s ∈ S may be sampled from this policy conditioned on t ∈ T .
• Reward: We use a simple reward function where we assign a reward +1 for a correct
prediction and -1 for an incorrect prediction using the classifier fL(C) where fL is the label
remapping function and C is the classifier. Formally:
r(t,s) =

+1, fL(C(s)) = lt
−1, fL(C(s)) 6= lt
The optimization objective to train the policy network is the following:
max
θ
J(θ) where, J(θ) = Epiadv[r(t,s)]
Following the REINFORCE algorithm [63] we can write the gradient of the expectation with
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respect to θ as per the following:
∇θJ = ∇θ
[
E
piadv
[r(t,s)]
]
= ∇θ
[
∑
s
piadv(s|t;θ)r(t,s)
]
= ∑
s
piadv(s|t;θ)∇θ log(piadv(s|t;θ))r(t,s)
= E
piadv
[r(t,s)∇θ log(piadv(s|t;θ))]
= E
piadv
[r(t,s)∇θ log(piadv(s1, ..,sN |t;θ))]
= E
piadv
[
r(t,s)∇θ log(∏
i
piadv(si|t;θ))
]
= E
piadv
[
r(t,s)∑
i
∇θ log(piadv(si|t;θ))
]
Note that piadv(si|t;θ) is the same as pii defined in equation 2.2 which can be differentiated
with respect to θ. The expectations are estimated as sample averages. Having obtained the
gradient of expected reward, we can use mini-batch gradient ascent to update θ with a learning
rate α as: θ← θ+α∇θJ.
2.3 Experiments
2.3.1 Datasets and Classifiers
We demonstrate the application of the proposed reprogramming techniques on various
text-classification tasks. In our experiments, we design adversarial programs to attack both
word-level and character-level text classifiers. Additionally, we aim to adversarially repurpose
a character-level text classifier for a word-level classification task and vice-versa. To this end,
we choose the following text-classification datasets as candidates for the original and adversarial
classification tasks:
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• Surname Classification Dataset (Names-18, Names-5)[51]: The dataset categorizes sur-
names from 18 languages of origin. We use this dataset for character-level classification task.
We use a subset of this dataset Names-5 containing Names from 5 classes: Dutch, Scottish,
Polish, Korean and Portuguese, as a candidate for adversarial task in the experiments.
• Experimental Data for Question Classification (Questions) [38]: categorizes around 5500
questions into 6 classes: Abbreviation, Entity, Description, Human, Location, Numeric. We
divide this dataset into 4361 questions for training and 1091 for testing.
• Arabic Tweets Sentiment Classification Dataset [3]: contains 2000 binary labeled tweets
on diverse topics such as politics and arts. The tweets in this dataset, comprising of 1000
positive and 1000 negative tweets, are written in Modern Standard Arabic (MSA) and the
Jordanian dialect. We use 1600 samples for training and 400 for testing.
• Large Movie Review Dataset (IMDB) for sentiment classification [40]: contains 50,000
movie reviews categorized into binary class of positive and negative sentiment. It is split
into 25,000 reviews for training and 25,000 reviews for testing.
The statistics of the above mentioned datasets have been given in table 2.1. We train
adversarial reprogramming functions to repurpose various text-classifiers based on Long Short-
Term Memory (LSTM) network [30], bidirectional LSTM network [25] and Convolutional neural
network [33] models. All the aforementioned models can be trained for both word-level and
character-level classification. We use character level classifiers for Names-18 and Names-5
datasets and word-level classifiers for IMDB, Questions and Arabic Tweets datasets. We use
randomly initialized word/character embeddings for all the classification models. For LSTM, we
use the output at last timestep for prediction. For the Bi-LSTM, we combine the outputs of the
first and last time step for prediction. For the Convolutional Neural Network we follow the same
architecture as [33]. The hyper-parameter details of these classifiers have been included in table 2
of the supplementary material.
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Table 2.1: Summary of datasets and test accuracy of original classification models. |V | denotes
the vocabulary size of each dataset. Note that we use character-level models for Names-5 and
Names-18 and word-level models for all other tasks.
Test Accuracy (%)
Data Set # Classes Train Samples Test Samples |V | Avg Length LSTM Bi-LSTM CNN
Names-18 18 115,028 28,758 90 7.1 97.84 97.84 97.88
Names-5 5 3632 909 66 6.5 99.88 99.88 99.77
Questions 6 4361 1091 1205 11.2 96.70 98.25 98.07
Arabic Tweets 2 1600 400 955 9.7 87.25 88.75 88.00
IMDB 2 25,000 25,000 10000 246.8 86.83 89.43 90.02
2.3.2 Experimental Setup
As described in the methodology section, the label remapping function fL we use, is a
one-to-one mapping between the labels of the original task and the adversarial task. Therefore it
is required to apply the constraint that the number of classes of the adversarial task are less than
or equal to the number of classes of the original task. We choose Names-5, Arabic Tweets and
Question Classification as candidates for the adversarial tasks and repurpose the models allowed
under this constraint. We use context size k = 5 for all our experiments.
In white-box attacks, we use the Gumbel-Softmax based approach described in the
methodology to train the adversarial program. The details of the temperature annealing process are
included in table 1 of the supplementary material. For black-box attacks, we use the REINFORCE
algorithm described in methodology, on mini-batches of sequences. Since the action space for
certain reprogramming problems, (eg. reprogramming of IMDB classifier) is large (|VS|= 10000),
we restrict the output of the adversarial program to most frequent 1000 tokens in the vocabulary
VS. We use Adam optimizer [34] for all our experiments. Hyperparameter details of all our
experiments are included in table 1 of the supplementary material.
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Table 2.2: Adversarial Reprogramming Experiments: The accuracies of white-box and
black-box reprogramming experiments on different combinations of original task, adversarial
task and model. Figures in bold correspond to our best results on a particular adversarial task in
the given attack scenario scenario (black-box and white-box). White-box on Random Network
column presents results of the white-box attack on an untrained neural network. Context size
k = 5 is used for all our experiments.
Test Accuracy (%)
Victim
Model
Original
Task
Adversarial
Task Black-box White-Box
White-Box on
Random
Network
LSTM
Questions Names-5 80.96 97.03 44.33
Questions Arabic Tweets 73.50 87.50 50.00
Names-18 Questions 68.56 95.23 28.23
Names-18 Arabic Tweets 83.00 84.75 51.50
IMDB Arabic Tweets 80.75 88.25 50.50
Bi-LSTM
Questions Names-5 93.51 99.66 63.14
Questions Arabic Tweets 81.75 83.50 70.00
Names-18 Questions 94.96 97.15 80.01
Names-18 Arabic Tweets 78.75 84.25 69.25
IMDB Arabic Tweets 83.25 86.75 84.00
CNN
Questions Names-5 88.90 99.22 93.06
Questions Arabic Tweets 82.25 87.25 76.25
Names-18 Questions 71.03 97.61 33.45
Names-18 Arabic Tweets 80.75 86.50 60.00
IMDB Arabic Tweets 84.00 87.00 84.25
2.3.3 Results and Discussions
The accuracies of all adversarial reprogramming experiments have been reported in table
2.2. To interpret the results in context, the accuracies achieved by the LSTM, Bi-LSTM and CNN
text classification models on the adversarial tasks can be found in table 2.1.
We demonstrate how character-level models trained on Names-18 dataset can be repur-
posed for word-level sequence classification tasks like Question Classification and Arabic Tweet
Sentiment Classification. Similarly, word-level classifiers trained on Question Classification
Dataset can be repurposed for the character-level Surname classification task. Interestingly,
19
classifiers trained on IMDB Movie Review Dataset can be repurposed for Arabic Tweet Sentiment
Classification even though there is a high difference between the vocabulary size (10000 vs
955) and average sequence length(246.8 vs 9.7) of the two tasks. It can be seen that all of the
three classification models are susceptible to adversarial reprogramming in both white-box and
black-box setting.
White-box based reprogramming outperforms the black-box based approach in all of our
experiments. Figure 2.3 shows the learning curves for both white-box and black-box attacks. In
practice, we find that training the adversarial program in the black-box scenario requires careful
hyper-parameter tuning for REINFORCE to work. We believe that improved reinforcement
learning techniques for sequence generation tasks [10, 9] can make the training procedure for
black-box attack more stable. We propose such improvement as a direction of future research.
Figure 2.3: Top: Training and validation accuracy plots for 2 different white-box experiments.
Bottom: Accuracy and reward plots for a black-box training experiment.
To assess the importance of the original task on which the network was trained, we
also present results of white-box adversarial reprogramming on untrained random network.
Our results are coherent with similar experiments on adversarial reprogramming of untrained
ImageNet models [22] demonstrating that adversarial reprogramming is less effective when it
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targets untrained networks. The figures in table 2.2 suggest that the representations learned by
training a text classifier on an original task, are important for repurposing it for an alternate task.
However another plausible reason as discussed by Elsayed et al. is that the reduced performance
on random networks might be because of simpler reasons like poor scaling of network weight
initialization making the optimization problem harder.
Adversarial Sequences:
Figure 2.4 shows some adversarial sequences generated by the adversarial program for
Names-5 Classification while attacking a CNN trained on the Question Classification dataset. A
sequence t in the first column is transformed into the adversarial sequence s in the second column
by the trained adversarial reprogramming function. Note that in contrast to traditional adversarial
examples, the generated adversarial sequences need not be constrained by a small perturbation to
the valid input sequence of the original task. While these adversarial sequences may not make
semantic or grammatical sense, it exploits the learned representation of the classifier to map the
inputs to the desired class. For example, sequences that should be mapped to HUMAN class
have words like Who in the generated adversarial sequence. Similarly, sequences that should be
mapped to LOCATION class have words like world, city in the adversarial sequence. Other such
interpretable transformations are depicted via colored text in the adversarial sequences of Figure
2.4.
Effect of Context Size:
By varying the context size k of the convolutional kernel θk×|VT |×|VS| in our adversarial
program we are able to control the representational capacity of the adversarial reprogramming
function. Figure 2.5 shows the percentage accuracy obtained when training the adversarial pro-
gram with different context sizes k on two different adversarial tasks: Arabic Tweets Classification
and Name Classification. Using a context size k = 1 reduces the adversarial reprogramming
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Adversarial 
Task 
Sequence (t) 
(Names-5)
Adversarial Program Output (s) (Question 
Classification)
Prediction by 
Classifier
Mapped 
Class Actual Class
Ryoo white sport substance animal All off .. ENTITY Korean Korean
Houtum player video exp abb What does off is off .. ABBREVIATION Dutch Dutch
Winogrodzki manner France manner video def oil def reason desc What do All off .. DESCRIPTION Polish Polish
Murphy world live exp city What university All is off .. LOCATION Scottish Scottish
Paulissen player stars along abb abb exp exp always abb What is off .. ABBREVIATION Dutch Dutch
Henriques other always live What Who does ind Who gold is off .. HUMAN Portuguese Portuguese
Maly world attend home abb home is off .. LOCATION Scottish Polish
Kasprzak does exp exp def manner does reason What does off .. DESCRIPTION Polish Polish
Ferreiro e-mail Who ind exp Who ind university university gold off .. HUMAN Portuguese Portuguese
Hong sport cremat substance university is off .. ENTITY Korean Korean
Figure 2.4: Adversarial sequences generated by our adversarial program for Names-5 Classifi-
cation (adversarial task), when targeting a CNN trained on the Question Classification dataset
(original task). Interpretable transformations are shown as colored words in the second column.
Adversarial program outputs that are mapped to the same class are depicted with the same color
in the second column.
function to simply a vocabulary remapping function from VS to VT . It can be observed that
the performance of the adversarial reprogramming model at k = 1 is significantly worse than
that at higher values of k. While higher values of k improve the performance of the adversarial
program, they come at a cost of increased computational complexity and memory required for the
adversarial reprogramming function. For the adversarial tasks studied in this paper, we observe
that k = 5 is a reasonable choice for context size of the adversarial program.
2.3.4 Conclusion
In this work, we extend adversarial reprogramming, a new class of adversarial attacks, to
target sequence classification neural networks. We introduce a novel adversarial program and
present training algorithms in both white-box and black-box settings. Our results demonstrate
the effectiveness of such attacks in the more challenging black-box settings, posing them as a
strong threat in real-world attack scenarios. We demonstrate, for the first time, that recurrent
neural networks (RNNs) can be reprogrammed for alternate tasks, which opens doors to solve
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Figure 2.5: Accuracy vs Context size (k) plots for all 3 classification models on 2 different
adversarial reprogramming experiments.
more ambitious problems such as repurposing them for mining cryptocurrrency. Due to the threat
presented by adversarial reprogramming, we recommend future work to study defenses against
such attacks.
Chapter 2, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in AAAI 2019 workshop on
Engineering Dependable and Secure Machine Learning Systems. Neekhara, Paarth; Hussain,
Shehzeen; Dubnov, Shlomo; Koushanfar, Farinaz. The dissertation/thesis author was the primary
investigator and author of this paper.
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Chapter 3
Universal Adversarial Pertrubations for
Speech Recognition Systems
3.1 Introduction
Machine learning agents serve as the backbone of several speech recognition systems,
widely used in personal assistants of smartphones and home electronic devices (e.g. Apple Siri,
Google Assistant). Traditionally, Hidden Markov Models (HMMs) [14, 15, 4, 5, 11] were used to
model sequential data but with the advent of deep learning, state-of-the-art speech recognition
systems are based on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) [7, 62, 61, 29]. However, several studies
have demonstrated that DNNs are vulnerable to adversarial examples [24, 8, 19, 35, 44]. An
adversarial example is a sample from the classifier’s input domain which has been perturbed in a
way that is intended to fool a victim machine learning (ML) model. While the perturbation is
usually imperceptible, such an adversarial input can mislead neural network models deployed in
real-world settings causing it to output an incorrect class label with higher confidence.
The majority of past research in adversarial machine learning has shown such attacks
to be successful in the image domain [58, 44, 47, 49, 46, 17, 23]. However, few works have
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addressed attack scenarios involving other modalities such as audio. This limits our understanding
of system vulnerabilities of many commercial speech recognition models employing DNNs, such
as Amazon Alexa, Google Assistant, and home electronic devices like Amazon Echo and Google
Home. Recent studies that have explored attacks on automatic speech recognition (ASR) systems
[6, 18, 20, 64], have demonstrated that adversarial examples exist in the audio domain. The
authors of [18] proposed targeted attacks where an adversary designs a perturbation that can
cause the original audio signal to be transcribed to any phrase desired by the adversary. However,
calculating such perturbations requires the adversary to solve an optimization problem for each
data-point they wish to mis-transcribe. This makes the attack in-applicable in real-time since the
adversary would need to re-solve the data-dependent optimization problem from scratch for every
new data-point.
Universal Adversarial Perturbations [42] have demonstrated that there exist universal
image-agnostic perturbations which when added to any image will cause the image to be mis-
classified by a victim network with high probability. The existence of such perturbations poses a
threat to machine learning models in real world settings since the adversary may simply add the
same pre-computed universal perturbation to a new image and cause mis-classification.
In this work, we seek to answer the question “Do universal adversarial perturbations exist
for neural networks in audio domain?” We demonstrate the existence of universal audio-agnostic
perturbations that can fool DNN based ASR systems 1. We propose an algorithm to design
such universal perturbations against a victim ASR model in the white-box setting, where the
adversary has access to the victim’s model architecture and parameters. We validate the feasibility
of our algorithm, by crafting such perturbations for Mozilla’s open source implementation of
the state-of-the-art speech recognition system DeepSpeech [29]. Additionally, we discover that
the generated universal perturbation is transferable to a significant extent across different model
architectures. Particularly, we demonstrate that a universal perturbation trained on DeepSpeech
1Sound Examples: http://universal-audio-perturbation.herokuapp.com
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can cause significant transcription error on a WaveNet [61] based ASR model.
3.2 Related Work
Adversarial Attacks in the Audio Domain: Adversarial attacks on ASR systems have primarily
focused on targeted attacks to embed carefully crafted perturbations into speech signals, such
that the victim model transcribes the input audio into a specific malicious phrase, as desired by
the adversary [6, 18, 31, 20, 60]. Prior works [20, 60] demonstrate successful attack algorithms
targeting traditional speech recognition models based on HMMs and GMMs, that operate on Mel
Frequency Cepstral Coefficient (MFCC) representation of audio. In Hidden Voice Commands
[20], the attacker uses inverse feature extraction to generate obfuscated audio that can be played
over-the-air to attack ASR systems. However, obfuscated samples sound like random noise rather
than normal human perceptible speech and therefore come at the cost of being fairly perceptible
to human listeners. Additionally, these attack frameworks are not end-to-end, which render them
impractical for studying the vulnerabilities of modern ASR systems based on DNNs.
In more recent work [18], Carlini et al. propose an end-to-end white-box attack technique
to craft adversarial examples, which transcribe to a target phrase. Similar to the work in images,
they propose a gradient-based optimization method that replaces the cross-entropy loss function
used for classification, with a Connectionist Temporal Classification (CTC) loss [26] which
is optimized for time-sequences. The CTC-loss between the target phrase and the network’s
output is backpropagated through the victim neural network and the MFCC computation, to
update the additive adversarial perturbation. The adversarial samples generated by this work are
quasi-perceptible, motivating a separate work [53] to minimize the perceptibility of the adversarial
perturbations using psychoacoustic hiding.
Designing adversarial perturbations using the above mentioned approaches requires the
adversary to solve a data dependent optimization problem for each input audio signal the adversary
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wishes to mis-transcribe, making them ineffective in a real-time attack scenario. The existence of
universal adversarial perturbations (described below) can pose a threat to ASR systems in real-
world settings since the adversary may simply add the same pre-computed universal adversarial
perturbation to any input audio and fool the DNN based ASR system.
Universal Adversarial Perturbations: The authors of [42] craft a single universal perturbation
vector which can fool a victim neural network to predict a false classification output on the
majority of validation instances. Let kˆ(x) be the classification output for an input x that belongs
to a distribution µ. The goal is to find a perturbation v such that: kˆ(x+ v) 6= kˆ(x) for “most”
x ∈ µ. This is formulated as an optimization problem with constraints to ensure that the universal
perturbation is within a specified p-norm and is also able to fool the desired number of instances
in the training set. The proposed algorithm iteratively goes over the training dataset to build a
universal perturbation vector that pushes each data point to its decision boundary. The authors
demonstrate that it is possible to find a quasi-imperceptible universal perturbation that pushes
most data points outside the correct classification region of a victim model. More interestingly, the
work demonstrates that the universal perturbations are transferable across models with different
architectures.
3.3 Methodology
3.3.1 Threat Model
We aim to find a universal audio perturbation, which when added to any speech waveform,
will cause an error in transcription by a speech recognition model with high probability. For
the success of the attack, the error in the transcription should be high enough so that the tran-
scription of the perturbed signal (adversarial transcription) is incomprehensible and the original
transcription cannot be deduced from the adversarial transcription. As discussed in [18], the
transcription “test sentence” mis-spelled as “test sentense” does little to help the adversary. To
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Figure 3.1: Threat Model: We aim to find a single perturbation which when added to any
arbitrary audio signal, will most likely cause an error in transcription by a victim Speech
Recognition System
make the adversary’s goal challenging, we report success only when the Character Error Rate
(CER) or the normalized Levenshtein distance (Edit Distance) [68] between the original and
adversarial transcription is greater than a particular threshold. Formally, we define our threat
model as follows:
Let µ denote a distribution of waveforms and C be the victim speech recognition model
that transcribes a waveform x to C(x). The goal of our work is to find perturbations v such that:
CER(C(x),C(x+ v))> t for “most” x ∈ µ
Here, CER(x,y) is the edit distance between the strings x and y normalized [68] by the
length of x i.e
CER(x,y) =
EditDistance(x,y)
length(x)
The threshold t is chosen as 0.5 for our experiments i.e., we report success only when
the original transcription has been edited by at least 50% of its length using character removal,
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insertion, or substitution operations.
The universal perturbation signal v is chosen to be of a fixed length and is cropped or
zero-padded at the end to make it equal to length of the signal x.
3.3.2 Distortion Metric
To quantify the distortion introduced by some adversarial perturbation v, an l∞ met-
ric is commonly used in the space of images. Following the same convention, in the audio
domain [19], the loudness of the perturbation can be quantified using the dB scale, where
dB(v) = maxi(20. log10(vi)). We calculate dBx(v) to quantify the relative loudness of the univer-
sal perturbation v with respect to an original waveform x where:
dBx(v) = dB(v)−dB(x)
Since the perturbation introduced is quieter than the original signal, dBx(v) is a negative value,
where smaller values indicate quieter distortions. In our results, we report the average relative
loudness: dBx(v) across the whole test set to quantify the distortion introduced by our universal
perturbation.
3.3.3 Problem Formulation and Algorithm
Our goal to find a quasi-imperceptible universal perturbation vector v such that it mis-
transcribes most data points sampled from a distribution µ. Mathematically, we want to find a
perturbation vector v that satisfies:
1. ‖v‖∞ < ε
2. P
x∼µ(CER(C(X),C(x+ v)> t))≥ 1−δ.
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Here ε is the maximum allowed l∞ norm of the perturbation, δ is the desired success rate and t is
the threshold CER chosen to define our success criteria.
To solve the above problem, we adapt the universal adversarial perturbation algorithm
proposed by [42] to find universal adversarial perturbations for the goal of mis-transciption of
speech waveforms instead of mis-classification of data (images). Let X = x1,x2, . . . ,xm be a set
of speech signals sampled from the distribution µ. The algorithm (Algorithm 1) goes over the
data-points in X iteratively and gradually builds the perturbation vector v. At each iteration i, we
seek a minimum perturbation ∆vi, that causes an error in the transcription of the current perturbed
data point xi+v. We then add this additional perturbation ∆vi to the current universal perturbation
v and clip the new perturbation v, if necessary, to satisfy the constraint ‖v‖∞ < ε.
Algorithm 1 Universal Adversarial Perturbations for Speech Recognition Systems
1: input: Data Points X , Validation Set Xv, Victim Model C, allowed distortion level ε, desired
success rate δ
2: output: Universal Adversarial Perturbation vector v
3: Initialize v← 0
4: while Err(Xv)< 1−δ do
5: for each data point xi ∈ X do
6: if CER(C(xi+ v+ r),C(xi))< t then
7: Compute min perturbation that mis-transcribes xi+ v: ∆vi← argminr ‖r‖2 s.t.:
CER(C(xi+ v+ r),C(xi))> t
8: Update and clip universal perturbation v: v = Clipv,ε(v+∆vi)
At each iteration we need to solve the following optimization problem, that seeks a
minimum (under l2 norm) additional perturbation ∆vi, to mis-transcribe the current perturbed
audio signal xi+ v:
∆vi← argmin
r
‖r‖2 s.t. CER(C(xi+ v+ r),C(xi))> t (3.1)
It is non-trivial to solve the above optimization in its current form. In [42], the authors try
to solve a similar optimization problem for the goal of mis-classification of data points. They
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approximate its solution using DeepFool [43] which finds a minimum perturbation vector that
pushes a data point to its decision boundary. Since we are tackling a more challenging goal of
mis-transcription of signals where we have decision boundaries for each audio frame across the
time axis, the same idea cannot be directly applied. Therefore, we approximate the solution to the
optimization problem given by (3.1) by solving a more tractable optimization problem:
Minimize J(r) where
J(r) = c‖r‖2+L(xi+ v+ r,C(xi))
s.t. ‖v+ r‖∞ < ε
where L(x,y) =−CTCLoss( f (x),y)
(3.2)
In other words, to mis-transcribe the signal, we aim to maximize the CTC-Loss between
the predicted probability distributions of the perturbed signal f (xi + v+ r) and the original
transcription C(xi) while having a regularization penalty on the l2 norm of r. Since this a non-
convex optimization problem, we approximate its solution using iterative gradient sign method
[36]:
r0 =
−→
0
rN+1 = Clipr+v,ε{rN−αsign(∆rN J(rN)}
(3.3)
Note that the error J is back-propagated through the entire neural network and the MFCC
computation to the perturbation vector r. We iterate until we reach the desired CER threshold t
for a particular data point xi. The regularization constant c is chosen through hyper-parameter
search on a validation set to find the maximum success rate for a given magnitude of allowed
perturbation.
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3.4 Experimental Details
We demonstrate the application of our proposed attack algorithm on the pre-trained
Mozilla DeepSpeech model [2, 29]. We train our algorithm on the Mozilla Common Voice
Dataset [29] which contains 582 hours of audio across 400,000 recordings in English. We train
on a randomly selected set X containing 5,000 audio files from the training set and evaluate our
model on both the training set X and the entire unseen validation set of the Mozilla Common
Voice Dataset. We analyze the effect of the size of the set X below. The length of our universal
adversarial perturbation is fixed to 150,000 samples which corresponds to around 9 seconds of
audio at 16 KHz. The universal adversarial perturbations are trained using our proposed algorithm
1 with a learning rate α= 5 and the regularization parameter c set to 0.5.
Evaluation: We utilize two metrics: i) Mean CER - Character Error Rate averaged over the entire
test set and ii) Success Rate to evaluate our universal adversarial perturbations. We report success
on a particular waveform, if the CER between the original and adversarial transcription (Section
3.3.1) is greater than 0.5. The amount of perturbation is quantified using mean relative distortion
dBx(v) over the test set (Refer to Section 3.3.2).
3.5 Results
Table 3.1 shows the results of our algorithm for different allowed magnitude of universal
adversarial perturbation on both the training set X and the unseen Test Set. Both the success
rate and the Mean Character Error Rate (CER) increase with increase in the maximum allowed
perturbation. We achieve a success rate of 89.06 % on the validation set, with the mean distortion
metric dBx(v) ≈ −32dB. To interpret the results in context, −32dB is roughly the difference
between ambient noise in a quiet room and a person talking [56, 18] . We encourage the reader
to listen to our adversarial samples and their corresponding transcriptions on our web page:
http://universal-audio-perturbation.herokuapp.com
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Table 3.1: Results of our algorithm for different allowed magnitude of universal adversarial
perturbation
Training Set (X) Test Set
‖v‖∞ MeandBx(v)
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
Mean
dBx(v)
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
100 -42.03 57.46 0.63 -41.86 56.13 0.64
150 -38.51 72.78 0.81 -38.34 72.49 0.82
200 -36.01 83.27 0.92 -35.84 80.47 0.95
300 -32.49 89.52 1.10 -32.32 89.06 1.11
400 -30.18 90.60 1.06 -29.82 88.24 1.07
Figure 3.2 shows the success rate and mean edit distance compared to the size of the training set
X for maximum allowed perturbation ‖v‖∞ = 200 (Mean dBx(v) =−36.01). We observe that it
is possible to train our proposed algorithm on very few examples and achieve reasonable success
rates on unseen data. For example, training on just 1000 examples can achieve a success rate of
80.47 % on the test set.
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Figure 3.2: Attack Success Rate on the test set vs. the number of audio files in the training set X
3.5.1 Effectiveness of universal perturbations
In order to assess the vulnerability of the victim Speech Recognition System to our attack
algorithm, we compare our universal perturbation with random (uniform) perturbation having the
same magnitude of distortion (same ‖v‖∞) as our universal adversarial perturbation. Figure 3.3
shows the plot of success rate vs. the magnitude of the perturbation for each of these perturbations.
It can be seen that universal adversarial perturbations are able to achieve high success rate with
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Figure 3.3: Success Rate vs ‖v‖∞ of universal and random perturbations.
very low magnitude of distortion as compared to a random noise perturbation. For example,
for allowed perturbation ‖v‖∞ = 100 our universal perturbation achieves a success rate of 65%
which is substantially higher than the success rate of random noise. This implies that for the
same magnitude of distortion, distorting an audio waveform in a random direction is significantly
less likely to cause mis-transcription as compared to distorting the waveform in the direction of
universal perturbation. Our results support the hypothesis discussed in [42], demonstrating that
universal adversarial perturbations exploit geometric correlations in the decision boundaries of
the victim model.
Table 3.2: Results of the same universal adversarial perturbation on two victim models: Wavenet
and Mozilla DeepSpeech. The universal perturbation was trained on the DeepSpeech model.
Wavenet Mozilla DeepSpeech
‖v‖∞ MeandBx(v)
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
Success
Rate (%)
Mean
CER
150 -38.34 26.97 0.37 72.49 0.82
200 -35.84 31.18 0.40 80.47 0.95
300 -32.32 42.05 0.47 89.06 1.11
400 -29.82 63.28 0.60 88.24 1.07
3.5.2 Cross-model Transferability
We perform a study on the transferability of adversarial samples to deceive ML models
that have not been used for training the universal adversarial perturbation, i.e., their parameters
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and network structures are not revealed to the attacker. We train universal adversarial perturbations
for Mozilla DeepSpeech and evaluate the extent to which they are valid for a different ASR
architecture based on WaveNet [61]. For this study, we use a publicly available pre-trained model
of WaveNet [1] and evaluate the transcriptions obtained using clean and adversarial audio for
the same unseen validation dataset as used in our previous experiments. Our results in Table 3.2
indicate that our attack is transferable to a significant extent for this particular setting. Specifically,
when the mean dBx(v) =−29.82, we are able to achieve a 63.28% success rate while attacking
the WaveNet based ASR model. This result demonstrates the practicality of such adversarial
perturbations, since they are able to generalize well across data points and architectures.
3.6 Conclusion
In this work, we demonstrate the existence of audio-agnostic adversarial perturbations for
speech recognition systems. We demonstrate that the audio-agnostic perturbation generalizes well
across unseen data points and to some extent across unseen networks. Our proposed end-to-end
approach can be used to further understand the vulnerabilities and blind spots of deep neural
network based ASR system, and provide insights for building more robust neural networks.
Chapter 3, in full, is a reprint of the material as it appears in the supplementary DSN
2019 proceedings. Neekhara, Paarth; Hussain, Shehzeen; Pandey, Prakhar; Dubnov, Shlomo;
McAuley, Julian, Koushanfar, Farinaz. The dissertation/thesis author was the primary investigator
and author of this paper.
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Chapter 4
Conclusion
In our work we demonstrated two main vulnerabilities of neural sequence models which
makes secure real world deployment of such models a challenge:
• The ability to repurpose neural sequence models for an adversarial task.
• The existence of universal adversarial perturbations for speech recognition systems.
Concurrent with our work, there have been ongoing works in this domain which expose
vulnerabilities of neural sequence models and develop defences against them. In this chapter,
we will discuss some of these works and talk about some open research questions in the field of
adversarial attacks and defences for neural sequence models.
4.1 Recent Advances
In this section we discuss some recent advances in the field of adversarial machine learning
which pose new research questions and lay the directions for future work.
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4.1.1 Imperceptible, Robust and Targeted Adversarial Examples for Au-
tomatic Speech Recognition
This work [50] focuses on developing targeted adversarial examples for speech recog-
nition systems that are imperceptible and robust to ambient noise when played in a simulated
environment. The authors propose a white box attack and demonstrate the application on a state
of the art ASR system google Lingvo.
To construct imperceptible adversarial examples for automatic speech recognition system,
this work uses frequency masking, which refers to the phenomenon that a louder signal can
make other signals at nearby frequencies imperceptible. Through this process of psycho-acoustic
hiding, the authors retain the 100% success rate of Carilini’s attack [18] while being effectively
imperceptible under as per the conducted user study.
In order to improve the robustness of adversarial examples when playing over-the-air, the
authors use the Image Source Method to create the room impulse responses based on the room
configurations (e.g., the room dimension, source audio and target microphones location). The
room impulse responses are then convolved with the audio to create artificial utterances (speech
with reverberations) that mimic playing the audio over-the-air.
By combining both of the above techniques, the attacker can generate both imperceptible
and robust adversarial examples, which can achieve around 50% attack success rate in 100
simulated test rooms.
4.1.2 Characterizing Audio Adversarial Examples Using Temporal Depen-
dency
This work [66] explores methods to mitigate the effect of audio adversarial examples.
This paper first explores whether the lessons learned in the image domain for adversarial examples
apply to the audio domain. The authors study the effectiveness of audio adversarial examples
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under simple input transformations like quantization, local smoothing, down-sampling and auto-
encoding. They find these methods to be reasonably effective in detecting adversarial examples at
the cost of reduced performance of the ASR system. Another downside of these defenses is that
they can be easily bypassed if the attacker is aware of the defense being used in the ASR system.
The authors propose a novel defense that exploits temporal dependency which discrimi-
nates adversarial examples from the original ones. The authors observe that temporal dependencies
in an audio sample are no longer consistent after applying an adversarial perturbation. Based
on this observation, they propose a simple defense that compares the transcription of different
segments on an audio clip to judge whether an audio clip is adversarial or not.
The authors then try to break the defense assuming that the attacker is aware of the defnse.
The authors demonstrate that while it can be bypasses in a completely white-box attack scenario,
however, using an ensemble of such defenders make this attack less effective.
4.1.3 Are adversarial examples inevitable?
The recent works proposing defenses against adversarial examples, have one problematic
trend: They can easily be broken if the attacker is aware of the defense technique and its
parameters. This raises the fundamental question that whether adversarial examples are inevitable.
This paper [54] analyzes adversarial examples from a theoritical perspective and shows that for
certain classes of problems, adversarial examples are inevitable. Using experiments, the authors
explore the implications of theoretical guarantees for real-world problems and discuss how factors
such as dimensionality and image complexity limit a classifier’s robustness against adversarial
examples.
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4.2 Future Work
Based on our work and the recent advances in this field, we discuss some open research
questions which can be the directions of future research:
• What is the scope of adversarial reprogramming? An interesting area to explore in
adversarial reprogramming is to understand what kinds of classification problems can
be solved by reprogramming pre-trained neural networks. That is, how far can a simple
input transformation get us in both continuous and discrete adversarial reprogramming
problem setting. Also, is it possible to design a universal neural network which can be
easily reprogrammed for an alternate task using simple transformation on the inputs and
outputs?
• Can universal adversarial perturbations be played over the air? If universal adversar-
ial perturbations can be played over the air, it poses a real world threat to ASR systems
deployed in home electronic devices and smart phones. It will be interesting to study how
effective our universal audio perturbation is, when played over the air. Also, is it possible
to amend the training procedure using techniques similar to [50], to increase the chances of
an over the air attack?
• How to defend against audio adversarial attacks? Can we develop a provably secure
ASR system that is not vulnerable to adversarial attacks? Recent works on adversarial
defences in the image domain [41, 52] try to model the distribution of real images and
classify an image as adversarial if it does not lie on that manifold. Can we apply similar
ideas in the audio domain to defend against adversarial audio examples?
• Can we develop real-time targeted audio attacks? One challenge with the existing work
on targeted audio attacks is that the adversary needs to solve an optimization problem
for each audio clip they wish to mis-transcribe. While universal adversarial perturbation
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addresses this problem, it is an untargeted attack and cannot yield a target transcription.
Can we develop a real-time attack for ASR systems that can cause mis-transcription to a
target phrase without the need to resolve an optimization problem?
Besides the above, a more fundamental question that remains unanswered is whether or
not we can develop a provably secure machine learning model that can be robust to adversarial
examples without compromising on performance metrics. The existence of white-box attack
methods is a serious threat even in the black box attack scenarios since adversarial examples are
shown to be transferable. To ensure safe deployment of such models in real-world settings there
it is essential to address and explore the vulnerabilities of such systems.
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